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WATKINS v. COMMONWEALTH
1989 Va. Lexis 132
Supreme Court of Virginia
September 22, 1989
FACTS
Ronald Watkins, a black defendant, was convicted by jury of
robbery, Va. Code Ann. §18.2-58, and of capital murder in the
commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, Va. Code
Ann. §18.2-31 (d). Watkins had formerly worked for the victim,
William Martin McCauley, who operated a business called Allied
Services in a shopping center in Danville. Upon his arrest, Watkins
voluntarily confessed to committing both the robbery and the murder.
He stated to the police that he knew substantial amounts of cash were
kept on the premises and that the "help ... would get off at,6:00 p.m."
He than admitted that he was at Allied Services on May 76, 1988,
that he took money from both the filing cabinet drawer and the cash
register and that he stabbed McCauley and "cut his throat."
At the end of the first stage of the bifurcated trial, the jury found
Watkins guilty of capital murder and robbery and sentenced him to
life imprisonment for the robbery conviction. At the penalty stage,
the jury heard evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
and thereafter fixed Watkins' punishment at death based on both the
"future dangerousness" of the defendant and the "vileness" of the
crime. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the convictions and
sentence, finding no error in the record.
HOLDING
a) Challengesto the array:
The jury impanelled to hear Watkins' case consisted of one
black and eleven white members. The defense claimed that the jury
array, from which the petit jury was chosen, violated defendant's
Fourteenth Amendment right to the Equal Protection of the Law
which protects defendants from being subjected to irrational and
discriminatory classifications. Watkins further claimed that the array
violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury
because the array did not represent a fair cross section of the
community. The defense moved to discharge the venire on the
ground that the disparity between the minority representation in the
venire and in the community was evidence of a policy of systematic
exclusion of the minority which violates both the Fourteenth and the
Sixth Amendment protections. In particular, Watdns claimed that
minorities register to vote in a lower proportion than the general
population, and that the jury commissioner's reliance on the use of
the list of registered voters to form the jury array makes out a prima
facie case of systematic exclusion, under the Sixth Amendment,
which the Commonwealth failed to rebut.
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in addressing Watkins'
Fourteenth Amendment claim, denied it and stated that, "there is no
requirement that the petit jury actually chosen must mirror the racial
balance of the community...Ali that is required is a fair selection
system which does not systematically exclude any distinctive group
in the community." Watkins v. Commonwealth, _ Va. __, (1989).
The court continued that, "[in order to make out a prima facie case
of systematic exclusion, a litigant must show consistent underrepresentation of a distinctive group on juries in the community over
a period of time. Such under-representation in a particular case is not
Concluding that Watkins failed to make a
sufficient." Id. at .
showing of historic under-representation, the court held that the jury
array did not violate Watkins' Constitutional rights. The court did not
specifically address Watkins' Sixth Amendment claim.

b) Sentence based on racialprejudice:
A sentence will be deemed unconstitutional if it was based on
purposeful discrimination. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,292
(1987). Watldns claimed a constitutionally unacceptable risk that his
death sentence was influenced by racial prejudice. To support this
contention, Watdns provided evidence that of the five defendants
tried for capital murder in Danville since 1980, four of those
defendants were black, and were ultimately sentenced to death. The
fifth defendant was white and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Watdns claimed that this evidence tends to show that racial prejudice
influenced the penalty imposed by the jury in his case. The court held
that the evidence was wholly insufficient to support this claim
because Watkins failed to prove that the races of the victims made
any difference in their sentences and that there were any factors
indicating that the jurors in his case acted with any discriminatory
purpose.
c) Corroborationof confession:
Watkins claimed that the trial court erred when it refused to
instruct the jury that a conviction camot be based solely on the
uncorroborated confession of the defendant. It is widely accepted that
an accused cannot be convicted of a crime solely on his uncorroborated extrajudicial admission or confession. Rather, the corpus delicti
must also be corroborated. Cleekv. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 697,
698, 181 S.E. 359, 360 (1935). However, as in this case, where the
accused has fully confessed the crime, only slight corroborative
evidence is necessary to establish the corpus delicti. Clozza v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. 124, 133,321 S.E.2d 273,279 (1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985). As a matter of law, the trial court ruled
that Watkins' confession was sufficiently corroborated by the
circumstantial evidence presented. The Supreme Court of Virginia
upheld this determination and agreed that denying Watkins' jury
instruction was appropriate. "After the court had determined, as a
matter of law, that the confessions were sufficiently corroborated to
go to the jury, granting a jury instruction describing them as
"uncorroborated', or requiring the jury to decide whether they were
corroborated or not would indeed be incongruous." Watkins v.
Commonwealth, _ Va. at _.
Justice Whiting dissented to this part of the opinion because the
trial court had not allowed the jury to decide whether the corpus
delicti had indeed been established. He stated that "a defendant's
right to have the jury pass upon the sufficiency of the proof of all
elements of the crime is ... a due process right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Justice Whiting also based his dissent
on two prior Virginia Supreme Court cases which he believed
implicitly held that the issue whether the corpus delicti has been
established was for the jury to decide. See Plymale v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 582, 597, 79 S.E.2d 610, 618 (1954); Wheeler v.
Commonwealth, 192 Va. 665, 671, 66 S.E.2d 605, 608 (1951).
d) Paroleeligibility:
Watkins further claimed that the trial court erred when it failed
to allow his defense attorney to discuss with the jury Watkins' parole
eligibility so that the jury would know Watkins would be in the
penitentiary for a minimum of twenty years. The court stated that,
"our decisions have consistently foreclosed evidence or instructions
informing the jury of a defendant's parole eligibility in the event of a
life sentence." Watkins v. Commonwealth, _ Va. at_
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e) Unadjudicatedacts ofmisconduct:
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that unadjudicated acts of
prior criminal conduct could be used to prove the "future dangerousness" prong in the penalty phase of a capital trial. O'Dellv. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 699-700, 363 S.E.2d 491, 506-507 (1988). On
appeal, however, Watkins claimed that the use of prior unadjudicated
criminal conduct to prove "future dangerousness" is unconstitutional
unless the court specifies the standard of proof governing the
establishment of such conduct. Because Watkins failed to preserve
this issue at trial, the court would not consider it on appeal.
ANALYSIS
a) Challengesto the array:
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in addressing Watkins'
challenge to the jury array, correctly stated the principle that a
defendant must make a showing that a distinctive group has been
consistently under-represented on juries in the community over a
period of time in order to sustain a Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection violation. However, the court made no mention of a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury based
on a fair cross section of the community. Although the court was
correct in its assertion that a defendant has no right to have a petit
jury mirror the community, the defendant is entitled to a fair
opportunity to have such a jury by being afforded an array from
which no "cognizable" group has been excluded. Under-representation is primafacieevidence of systematic exclusion. Underrepresentation over a period of time is not a necessary component of
this Sixth Amendment claim. Watkins made a showing that there was
an under-representation of blacks on the jury array, and alleged that
this under-representation was due to a systematic exclusion brought
about by the jury commissioner's reliance on voter registration lists
to form the jury array. This evidence constituted primafacie proof
that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred. At this point, the
prosecution was under a duty to rebut this claim by proving that a
significant governmental interest justified the imbalance. The court,
rather than the prosecution provided a rebuttal to the claim.
b) Sentence based on racialprejudice:
In McCleskey v. Kemp, supra,the court recognized that there
could be a constitutionally unacceptable risk of racial bias in
sentencing. It found however, that even assuming validity of a
statewide study indicating that blacks who killed whites were
significantly more likely to be sentenced to death, McCleskey had not

presented evidence of the possibility of racism in his trial.
Watkins undertook to demonstrate that risk in his trial by proffer
of the recent actions of Danville juries in capital cases. The Supreme
Court of Virginia found his showing insufficient. The court invites,
however, defense counsel to make more detailed showings. Counsel
should, in a proper case, request the time and resources necessary to
make the showing suggested by the Court. A proper case might be
one, like Watkins, with a black defendant and a white victim, which
arises in a venue with a history of racial discrimination.
c) Corroborationof confession:
The correctness of determination of this issue depends on the
interpretation of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct 1068,25 L.
Ed. 2d 368 (1970), in which the United States Supreme Court held
that the prosecution has the burden of proving each and every
element of the crime with which the defendant is charged. In this
case, the court's holding, that it is a question of law for the court to
decide whether a confession has been sufficiently corroborated by the
prosecution, takes away from the jury the responsibility to find every
element of the offense.
d) Parole eligibility:
Evidence of defendant's parole eligibility is clearly relevant to
the mitigation of his penalty. Not only could this information weaken
the evidence of his future dangerousness to the community, but it is
also non-statutory mitigation evidence itself. This type of claim may
eventually win the approval of the courts, and should continue to be
asserted through proposed jury instructions.
e) Unadjudicatedacts of misconduct:
Finally, it is once again necessary to remind all attorneys of the
importance of preserving for appeal their objections to the rulings of
the trial court, and thereafter to raise those issues on appeal. The
constitutionality of using future dangerousness as an aggravating
factor has been specifically upheld by the United States Supreme
Court. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3391,
77 L. Ed. 2d 1090, 1097 (1983). Unanswered questions remain,
however, about the procedures for establishing that factor in a given
case. Those claims not properly preserved at trial or raised on appeal
may have been the ones which would have turned a death sentence
into a term of life imprisonment.
Summary and analysis by: Catherine M. Hobart

BUCHANAN v. COMMONWEALTH
1989 WL 109169 (Va.)
Supreme Court of Virginia
No. 890107, 890108
September 22, 1989
FACTS
Douglas McArthur Buchanan was convicted of capital murder
under Va. Code Ann. §18.2-31(7) for the murder of his father in the
same transaction in which he murdered his two half-brothers and his
step-mother. The Commonwealth had charged Buchanan with 5
different combinations of these murders in three different indictments. Buchanan also was convicted of first degree murder for all
four murders, Va. Code Ann. §18.2-32, and of use of a firearm in the
commission of a felony for each murder under Va. Code Ann. §18.253.1. Buchanan was sentenced to death for the capital murder
conviction, four terms of life imprisonment for the first degree

murder convictions and a total of 14 years for the firearms convictions.
All the murders took place within a two-hour time frame in the
family's home. Buchanan killed his father first by shooting him with
a .22-calibre rifle. Fifteen minutes later, his brothers arrived.
Buchanan shot the first brother as the boy came in the door. He shot
the second brother in the yard, but the boy did not die. Buchanan
helped the brother to the house, but then stabbed him once inside.
Buchanan waited inside the house for his step-mother and killed her
with the knife once she arrived.
Buchanan raised several issues on appeal. First, Buchanan
complained that the capital murder indictments failed to inform him

